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THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY:
NASA V. NELSON
RUSSELL T. GORKIN *

I. INTRODUCTION
1

Modern substantive due process was borne in the landmark case
2
Griswold v. Connecticut when the Supreme Court recognized that
“specific guarantees” within the Bill of Rights protect various “zones
3
of privacy.” Since then, the Court has guarded against interpretations
of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
that merely reflect the “policy preferences of the Members of [the
4
Supreme] Court” by limiting meaningful protection to those privacy
interests so “deeply rooted in our Nation’s history and tradition” that
5
they are deemed “fundamental.”
6
NASA v. Nelson presents the Supreme Court with the
opportunity to recognize another, more general privacy interest—the
7
right to informational privacy. Due, however, to the evolving nature
* 2012 J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law.
1. This framework provides the foundation for the protection afforded to the “liberty”
interest contained within the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3. Id. at 484. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (grounding the protection of these
privacy interests in the Due Process Clause).
4. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997).
5. Id. at 721; of course, one may allege infringements of other liberty interests not deemed
“fundamental rights,” but little real protection is afforded such interests since they are subject
only to rational-basis review. See Francis S. Chlapowski, The Constitutional Protection of
Informational Privacy, 71 B.U. L. REV. 133, 144–45 (1991) (stating that the finding of whether a
right is fundamental is often outcome-determinative because alleged infringements of rights
subjected to a strict scrutiny analysis are almost always found to be impermissible, while alleged
infringements of rights subjected to a rational basis review are almost always found to be
justifiable).
6. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson I), 530 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755
(2010).
7. This term has come to represent the privacy interest in “avoiding disclosure of personal
matters” first alluded to in Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); see infra Section III (A).
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8

of privacy, as well as the government’s longstanding practice of
9
collecting “personal” information, a “history and tradition” analysis is
unlikely to provide proof that such a right deserves constitutional
protection. Thus, if the Court wishes to find the right to informational
privacy constitutionally protected, it most likely will be forced to lend
credence to the notion that the Due Process Clause protects not only
fundamental rights deeply rooted in history and tradition, but also
10
“unalienable rights” “endowed [in people] by their Creator.”
Whether the Court will choose to recognize such a right and
significantly alter the approach it has taken to develop substantive
due process doctrine, however, is far from certain.
II. FACTS
The Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) is a federal research facility
owned by the National Aeronautics Space Agency (NASA) and is
operated by the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) pursuant
11
to a contract. Since its inception, NASA, like all federal agencies, has
conducted standard background investigations of its civil servant
employees through the use of the National Agency Check with
12
Inquiries (NACI) process. The NACI process first requires the
applicant to complete and submit Standard Form 85 (SF-85), which
requests “(1) background information, including residential,
educational, employment, and military histories; (2) the names of
three references . . . ; and (3) disclosure of any illegal drug use,
possession, supply, or manufacture within the past year, along with . . .
13
any treatment or counseling received.” Next, former employers,
landlords and the three references identified by the applicant in SF-85
are sent an “Investigative Request for Personal Information” (Form
14
42) to verify the information provided in SF-85. Form 42 asks the
8. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 9, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (U.S. October 5,
2010) [hereinafter Transcript] (Acting Solicitor General Katyal explained that “privacy is
something that is in flux in ways that other things aren’t, both in terms of our social
understandings, technology, and legislation itself.”).
9. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605 (“The collection of taxes, the distribution of welfare and social
security benefits, the supervision of public health, the direction of our Armed Forces, and the
enforcement of the criminal laws all require the orderly preservation of great quantities of
information, much of which is personal in character and potentially embarrassing or harmful if
disclosed.”)
10. Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 230 (1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
11. Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 870.
12. Id. at 871.
13. Id. at 870–71.
14. Id. at 871.
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recipient to indicate whether they “have any adverse information
about [the applicant’s] employment, residence, or activities
concerning violations of law, financial integrity, abuse of alcohol
and/or drugs, mental or emotional stability, general behavior or
15
conduct, or other matters.” The recipient is also provided an
opportunity to disclose any information already noted and to provide
any additional information that she feels “may have a bearing on this
16
person’s suitability for government employment.” Numerous
safeguards exist (e.g., the Privacy Act) to prevent public dissemination
17
of the information collected through the use of SF-85 and Form 42.
Finally, NASA and the Office for Personnel Management (OPM)
review the information collected on these forms to determine
18
suitability for access to NASA’s facilities.
In 2005, NASA revised its Security Program Procedural
Requirements to require all employees, regardless of whether they
were civil servants or contractors, to undergo the same NACI
19
investigation. When NASA unilaterally modified its contract with
Caltech in January of 2007, contract employees already working at
20
Caltech became subject to these security clearance requirements.
Despite initially opposing the new requirements, Caltech
subsequently adopted a policy that any JPL employee who did not
successfully complete the NACI process would be deemed to have
21
voluntarily resigned her Caltech employment.
A group of twenty-eight JPL scientists, engineers, and
administrative personnel (“respondents” or “employees”), all
22
classified as “low-risk” employees, filed suit in August 2007 alleging,
15. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
16. Id. at 874.
17. See Brief for Petitioners at 28–30, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (U.S. May 20, 2010).
18. Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 871. The Ninth Circuit appears to have based its decision, at least
in part, on the fact that a document entitled “Issue Characterization Chart” might be used by
NASA to determine “suitability”; the document lists “sodomy, carnal knowledge, abusive
language, personality conflict, bad check, credit history, physical health issues, and mental,
emotional, psychological or psychiatric issues” as potential criteria. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson
II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1033 (9th Cir. 2008), denial for rehearing en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
1755 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The parties disagree over whether the “Issue
Characterization Chart” will potentially be used by NASA to determine suitability, and whether
this controversy is even properly before the Court. See infra Section V (B).
19. Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 871.
20. Id. at 871–72. Before these contract modifications, JPL employees had undergone
background checks conducted by Caltech, but they had never been subjected to the NACI
process.
21. Id. at 872.
22. Federal agencies classify positions as low, moderate, or high-risk, with the latter two
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inter alia, that NASA’s newly imposed NACI background
investigation requirement violates its members’ constitutional right to
23
informational privacy. In September, the employees moved for a
preliminary injunction to prevent Caltech from implementing its
policy requiring that they submit SF-85 by early October as a
24
condition for continued employment. The district court denied the
employees’ request, finding that although the right to informational
privacy was implicated, SF-85 was narrowly tailored to further the
25
government’s legitimate security interests. A motions panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a temporary stay,
finding that the “balance of hardships tips sharply in [employees’]
favor” due to the consequences that would result from refusal to
submit to the NACI process before an appeal on the merits could be
26
heard.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution provides, in pertinent part: “No person shall be . . .
27
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” The
substantive aspects of this liberty interest initially were interpreted by
28
the Lochner Court to protect an individual’s right to enter contracts
without interference from the government, but this approach was
29
30
later rejected. The Court’s holding in Griswold v. Connecticut
31
marked the birth of noneconomic substantive due process doctrine,
32
and Roe v. Wade cemented the basis for the privacy interests

groups normally designated as “public trust” positions. 5 C.F.R. §731.106(a)(b) (2010).
23. Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 872.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson III), 506 F.3d 713, 716 (9th Cir. 2007).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment contains a similar clause
protecting these interests from State intrusion: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Id. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
28. Named after the landmark case Lochner v. New York, the Lochner Court refers to the
era stretching from the late nineteenth century through the early-mid-twentieth century
characterized by judicial activism aimed at striking down statutes that interfered with liberty to
contract. See Chaplowski, supra note 5, at 136.
29. See Chaplowski, supra note 5, at 136–39 (discussing the rise and fall of the economic
liberty interest protected by the Lochner Court).
30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a state law which prohibited
the use and dissemination of information relating to contraceptives).
31. Chaplowski, supra note 5, at 139 n.38.
32. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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33

recognized in Griswold in the Due Process Clause. Careful to avoid
34
a return to Lochner-era judicial activism, “[t]he Supreme Court has
since planted a set of ‘guideposts for responsible decisionmaking’
concerning limited fundamental rights ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s
history and tradition’ in an attempt ‘to rein in the subjective elements
35
that are necessarily present in due-process judicial review.’”
According to the Court’s jurisprudence, these rights include “the
rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and
upbringing of one’s children, to marital privacy, to use contraception,
36
to bodily integrity, and to abortion.” Yet, the Supreme Court
“hinted” thirty-three years ago that the Due Process Clause might
also protect the right to informational privacy but “has never said
37
another word about it.”
A. The Hint(s): Whalen v. Roe (and Nixon v. Administrator of
General Services)
38

In Whalen v. Roe, a group of doctors and patients alleged that a
New York statute allowing the state to collect and store the name and
address of any person receiving a specified class of drug prescription
39
violated a constitutional right to informational privacy. In a
unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the statute was the
“product of an orderly and rational legislative decision,” and that the
means used were a “reasonable exercise of New York’s broad police
40
powers.” The Court refused to strike down the statute merely
because its requirements were not proven to be completely necessary

33. See id. at 153 (“This right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Fourteenth
Amendment’s concept of . . . liberty . . . as we feel it is . . . . ”) (referencing the Fourteenth
Amendment and not the Fifth Amendment because the focus of the challenge was a state, and
not a federal, law).
34. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (“We must therefore ‘exercise
the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field,’ lest the liberty
interest protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transformed into the policy preferences
of the Members of this Court.”) (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
35. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1044–45 (9th Cir. 2008), denial for
rehearing en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (Callahan, J., dissenting) (quoting
Washington, 521 U.S. at 720–22).
36. Washington, 521 U.S. at 720 (internal citations omitted).
37. Nelson II, 568 F.3d at 1052 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (arguing that en banc review
should have been granted because the current state of the law is muddled, not because the court
of appeals necessarily misapplied circuit law).
38. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977).
39. See id. at 591.
40. Id. at 597–98.
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41

to satisfy the state’s interests.
The Court continued its analysis by recognizing “at least two
different kinds of [privacy] interests. One is the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is the interest in
42
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions.” The
Court concluded that because the statute contained sufficient
protections to prevent public dissemination of the information
collected, the statute did not, “on its face, pose a sufficiently grievous
threat to either [privacy] interest to establish a constitutional
43
violation.” It is important to note the Court’s implicit suggestion that
the mere collection of information by the government could result in
informational privacy right violations, even if the government does
44
not intend to publicly disseminate that information.
Finally, it is “strange” that the Court engaged in this privacy
45
analysis at all considering that it concluded its opinion with a
disclaimer stating that it had declined to decide whether the
46
Constitution actually protects a right to informational privacy.
Apparently, the Court found the analysis warranted because such a
47
right “arguably has its roots in the Constitution.”
48
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, decided during the
same year, is the only other case in which the Supreme Court has
addressed an informational privacy claim. There, former President
Nixon challenged the constitutionality of the recently enacted
49
Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (the Act).
The Act stipulated that the Administrator of General Services take
41. Id. at 598.
42. Id. at 599–600.
43. Id. at 600.
44. Brief for Respondents at 36, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (U.S. August 2, 2010)
(arguing that in Whalen, the Court stated that “[e]ven without public disclosure, it is, of course,
true that private information must be disclosed to the authorized employees of the New York
Department of Health . . . . Requiring such disclosures to representatives of the State . . . does
not automatically amount to an impermissible invasion of privacy.” 429 U.S. at 602 (emphasis
added). This statement therefore implies that although requiring one to make a disclosure to the
state may not be an automatic violation, violations may, given different circumstances, still be
found). Id.
45. Transcript, supra note 8, at 8 (General Katyal: “It’s just like in Whalen, because in
Whalen this Court assumed the existence of some sort of constitutional right and then said: Is
that right violated here?” Justice Scalia: “It’s a strange way to proceed. We normally don’t do
that, see? If there was a constitutional right, would it cover this?”).
46. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 605–06.
47. Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
48. Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
49. Id. at 429.
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custody of all presidential papers and tape recordings for screening by
Executive Branch archivists for the purpose of returning to the
President any materials that were “personal and private in nature,”
with the government retaining the remaining materials for historical
50
preservation. The Court employed a balancing test to analyze
Nixon’s claim, and found that it was without merit
[in light] of the limited intrusion of the screening process, of [his] status as
a public figure, of his lack of any expectation of privacy in the
overwhelming majority of the materials, of the important public interest in
preservation of the materials, and of the virtual impossibility of segregating
51
the small quantity of private materials without comprehensive screening.

The very fact that the Court considered whether Nixon’s
informational privacy rights had been violated, when public
dissemination was not an issue, lends strong support to the notion that
informational privacy concerns may be triggered by the mere
52
collection of information.
However, the precedential value of Nixon is mitigated by the
Court’s conflated analysis of the President’s Fourth and Fifth
53
Amendment privacy-violation claims. Because the materials in
which Nixon potentially had a legitimate expectation of privacy were
comingled with those in which he did not, the Court found the
screening process to be constitutionally permissible—it reflected the
least intrusive means to collect information in which the government
54
had a legitimate interest. Thus, the Court never independently
addressed Nixon’s informational privacy claim (i.e., what information
an individual can prohibit the government from collecting, and when,
if at all, this prohibition can be overcome); instead it focused on his
Fourth Amendment claim (i.e., whether the manner in which the
government collected the information to which it was entitled was
constitutionally permissible given any potential collateral
55
consequences).

50. Id.
51. Id. at 465.
52. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 37.
53. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 455–66. The Court addressed Nixon’s First Amendment privacy
challenge separately. See id. at 455 n.18.
54. Id. at 464.
55. See id. at 455–66.
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B. Lower courts recognize a constitutional right to informational
privacy
Despite the ambiguous nature of the decisions in both Whalen and
Nixon, most circuit courts have interpreted the holdings of these cases
56
as establishing a constitutional right to informational privacy. In
analyzing potential infringements, courts have relied on a balancing
test that weighs “the government’s interest in having or using the
57
information against the individual’s interest in denying access.”
Factors courts have considered in weighing these interests include:
[T]he type of record requested, the information it does or might contain,
the potential for harm in any subsequent nonconsensual disclosure, the
injury from disclosure to the relationship in which the record was
generated, the adequacy of safeguards to prevent unauthorized disclosure,
the degree of need for access, and whether there is an express statutory
mandate, articulated public policy, or other recognizable interest militating
58
toward access.

Other factors that may be relevant include whether the disclosure
is voluntary or compelled, whether the disclosure implicates a
fundamental right, whether the requested information has been kept
private or has been disclosed to third parties, and whether the
government is seeking and using the information in its role as
59
sovereign or as employer.
60
American Federation of Government Employees v. HUD and
61
National Treasury Employees Union v. U.S. Department of Treasury

56. See Stathros v. New York City Taxi & Limousine Comm’n, 198 F.3d 317, 322–23 (2d
Cir. 1999) (citing Whalen for proceeding with an analysis of whether financial disclosure
requirements violated Stathros’ right to privacy); see also Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No.
5 v. City of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1987); Walls v. City of Petersburg, 895 F.2d 188, 192
(4th Cir. 1990); Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132–33 (5th Cir. 1978); Denius v. Dunlap,
209 F.3d 944, 955 (7th Cir. 2000); Eagle v. Morgan, 88 F. 3d 620, 625 (8th Cir. 1996); Tuscon
Woman’s Clinic v. Eden, 379 F.3d 531, 551 (9th Cir. 2004); Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839
(10th Cir. 1986); Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1497 (11th Cir. 1985). But see
Borucki v. Ryan, 827 F.2d 836, 841–42 (1st Cir. 1987) (expressing concern regarding the
existence of such a right, but declining to address the issue); Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433,
442 (recognizing a privacy interest only when a fundamental right is implicated); Am. Fed’n of
Gov’t Emps. v. HUD, 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (expressing “grave doubts” as to the
existence of such a right, but proceeding to analyze and reject the claim anyway).
57. Doe v. Att’y Gen., 941 F.2d 780, 796 (9th Cir. 1991).
58. United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir. 1980).
59. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1052–54 (9th Cir. 2008), denial for
rehearing en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
60. Am. Fed’n, 118 F.3d. 786 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
61. Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 25 F.3d 237 (5th
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are the only two cases that involve privacy challenges by employees to
requests for information on standardized government forms similar to
62
those used in the NACI process. Neither court found the
63
informational privacy challenges to have merit. Central to both
courts’ reasoning were the measures put in place specifically to
64
prevent the public dissemination of the information disclosed.
IV. HOLDING
In Nelson v. NASA, the Ninth Circuit held that it was possible that
the JPL employees could succeed on the merits of their informational
privacy claim, and that the denial of a preliminary injunction against
the NACI process would force the employees into the Hobson’s
choice of suffering a potential infringement of their constitutional
65
rights or, due to Caltech’s new policy, resigning from their jobs.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a
66
preliminary injunction against the use of the NACI process.
Although the JPL employees conceded that many of the questions
contained within SF-85 are “unproblematic,” they challenged the
constitutionality of the following question:
In the last year, have you used, possessed, supplied, or manufactured illegal
drugs? . . . If you answered “Yes,” provide information relating to the types
of substance(s), the nature of the activity, and any other details relating to

Cir. 1994).
62. The challenges in both cases pertained to questions on SF-85P (used for “public trust”
officials), which is the slightly more intrusive equivalent to SF-85 (used for federal civil service
and contract employees). See Nelson II, 568 F.3d at 1047–48 (Callahan, J., dissenting). Compare
Questionnaire for Non-Sensitive Positions, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT,
http://opm.gov/Forms/pdf_fill/sf85.pdf (last visited Nov. 29, 2010) (SF-85 requests information
pertaining to drug use, etc. over the last year.) with Questionnaire for Public Trust Positions,
OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT, http://opm.gov/Forms/pdf_fill/sf85p.pdf (last visited
Nov. 29, 2010) (SF-85P requests information pertaining to drug use, etc. over the past five
years.).
63. Am. Fed’n, 118 F.3d at 795; NTEU, 25 F.3d at 244.
64. See Am. Fed’n, 118 F.3d at 793–94; NTEU, 25 F.3d at 244. Additionally, the court in
NTEU perhaps based its holding in greater part on the fact that the employees held positions of
“public trust,” and therefore were found to have reduced expectations of privacy. See NTEU, 25
F.3d at 243–44. The employees in Am. Fed’n were also “public trust” employees, but the court
only mentioned this fact in passing. See Am. Fed’n, 118 F.3d at 794.
65. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson I), 530 F.3d 865, 883 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
1755 (2010) The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling that the JPL employees were
unlikely to succeed on their Administrative Procedure Act and Fourth Amendment claims. Id.
at 877.
66. Id. at 878.
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your involvement with illegal drugs. Include any treatment or counseling
received.67

The Ninth Circuit held that while the employees’ informational
privacy rights potentially are implicated by the question requiring the
disclosure of any “use, possession, supply, and manufacture” of drugs,
68
the question is narrowly tailored to a legitimate government interest.
The Ninth Circuit explained that “the federal government has taken a
strong stance in its war on illegal drugs, and this stance would be
significantly undermined if its own employees and contractors freely
69
ignored its laws.” The Ninth Circuit also held, however, that
requiring the disclosure of “any treatment or counseling received”
70
likely infringes the employees’ informational privacy rights. The
Ninth Circuit provided two reasons for its holding. First, it held that
“[i]nformation relating to medical treatment and psychological
counseling fall squarely within the domain protected by the
71
constitutional right to informational privacy.” Second, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that such treatment or counseling “would
presumably lessen the government’s concerns regarding the
underlying activity,” and therefore the government had failed to
demonstrate any legitimate state interest to “compel,” rather than
72
make voluntary, such disclosures. Thus, in reversing the lower court
the Ninth Circuit held that constitutional questions remained
regarding this albeit narrow portion of the challenged question.
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit held that since SF-85 contains a
waiver authorizing the government to distribute Form 42, the district
court erred by also failing to address the employees’ informational
73
privacy claim with respect to Form 42. The Ninth Circuit held that
the open-ended inquiries within Form 42 are “much more
problematic” than SF-85. Although the government has legitimate
interests in ensuring JPL employees “are who they say they are” and
in securing the facility, the questions on Form 42 are too broad to be
74
considered “narrowly tailored” to achieving these interests. Finally,
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the authorization waiver contained
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 879.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 873–74.
Id. at 879–80.
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within SF-85, which allows the government “to obtain any
information from any source, subject to other releases being necessary
only in some vague and unspecified contexts,” lacked sufficient
standards to support a finding that such inquiries are, in fact, narrowly
75
tailored.
V. ARGUMENTS AND ANALYSIS
A. The Government (Petitioners)
Perhaps because of the muddled framework for analyzing
76
informational privacy claims, the government first makes two
general arguments militating against a finding of a violation of the
employees’ privacy rights before couching its argument within the
Ninth Circuit’s “legitimate interest/narrowly tailored” standard.
First, the government points out that it “often must collect
77
personal information to fulfill basic government functions,” and that
“constitutional privacy concerns are generally satisfied by safeguards
against [the] unauthorized” public dissemination of the information
78
collected. The government argues that the numerous protections in
79
place to prevent public dissemination, including the Privacy Act,
80
significantly reduce the strength of the employees’ claim.
Second, the government argues that the employees’ claim must be
analyzed in light of the fact that the government is collecting the
information in its role as employer, rather than as enforcer of the
81
laws. The Supreme Court has recognized that “the government could
not function effectively if ‘every employment decision became a
82
constitutional matter’,” and that “the employee’s expectation of
83
privacy must be assessed in the context of the employment relation.”
The government concludes by arguing that conducting employmentrelated background checks is a reasonable and accepted practice in

75. Id. at 881.
76. See supra Section III.
77. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 24–25; see supra note 9.
78. Id. at 17–18.
79. Id. at 27–29 (explaining the protections afforded by the Privacy Act).
80. Id.at 27–30 (detailing the various protections against public dissemination in the
present case).
81. Id. at 41–42.
82. Id. at 33 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
83. O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
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84

our society.
The government attacks both lines of the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning that led it to conclude that SF-85 violates the employees’
informational privacy rights. First, the government argues that the
information it seeks pertains not to a fundamental right but to recent
drug use, and that drug laws “put citizens on notice that this realm is
85
not a private one.” Thus, the government concludes that the
contested question “does not raise the same constitutional concerns
as questions having no relationship to unlawful activity or questions
86
intruding into” fundamental rights. Second, as an employer, the
government has a “legitimate interest” in knowing the extent to which
any employee is involved with illegal drugs, and the “treatment and
87
counseling” question, which is only used for the employee’s benefit,
aids the government in its assessment of whether the employee is
88
suitable for employment.
The government also attacks the Ninth Circuit’s finding that the
open-ended inquiries contained within Form 42 likely infringe
employees’ informational privacy rights, primarily on three grounds.
First, the government argues that Form 42 “is neither designed nor
used for unanchored inquiries into an individual’s personal affairs”
because the information requested is solicited expressly for the
purpose of determining suitability for government employment, and
the Privacy Act limits the collection of information by NASA to that
89
which is “relevant and necessary” to accomplish its purpose. Second,
the government argues that the mere fact that the inquiries made on
Form 42 are open-ended does not by itself raise constitutional
90
concerns, especially when the government is acting in a manner
91
consistent with “what any sensible private employer would do.”
92
Finally, relying primarily on Fourth Amendment precedent, the
government argues that information solicited from third-parties does
84. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 35–38.
85. Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 839 (10th Cir. 1986).
86. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 41.
87. Transcript, supra note 8, at 16.
88. See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 42–44;
89. Id. at 45.
90. Id. at 45–46.
91. Id. at 46 (quoting Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008),
denial for rehearing en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting)
(arguing that open-ended questions are commonplace and necessary in the employment
context)).
92. See id. at 53.
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not usually warrant constitutional protection “because once the
individual voluntarily discloses information to another, she
necessarily assumes the risk that the other person will disclose the
93
information to the government.”
B. JPL Employees (Respondents)
The employees’ strongest arguments are grounded in the Ninth
Circuit’s grant of a preliminary injunction. Unfortunately for the
employees, their substantive arguments are unconvincing or easily
rebutted, and the technicalities and interlocutory status of this
litigation on which they rely are unlikely to be availing given the
94
practical consequences of the Ninth Circuit’s holding.
Regarding SF-85, the employees first argue that the question
pertaining to “treatment or counseling” for drug use implicates
employees’ constitutional right to informational privacy because it
95
“relates to intimate health information” and because “discovery . . .
carries a risk of lost job opportunities, in addition to stigmatization
96
and embarrassment.” This argument, however, ignores the question’s
nature as a follow-up inquiry posed to an employee who has already
97
admitted to recent drug use. Thus, the “health information” sought is
not a “freestanding inquiry about treatment or counseling,” but is
limited to a subject about which the Ninth Circuit already found
98
constitutionally permissible to ask about. Further, responding to the
“treatment or counseling” question does not pose any material
additional risk to lost job opportunities, stigmatization, or
embarrassment considering the employee has “already reported both
99
the fact and nature of [his] illegal drug use.”
The employees then argue that because their informational
privacy rights have been implicated, under the Ninth Circuit’s
intermediate-scrutiny standard, the government must show a
100
“legitimate interest” for intruding on these rights. The employees
claim that the government failed to assert any such legitimate interest

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 53.
See infra Section VI (A).
Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 20.
Id. at 22.
Reply Brief for Petitioners at 16–17, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (Sept. 1, 2010).
Id.
Id. at 17.
Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 25.
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101

in the lower courts, and therefore the Ninth Circuit correctly
concluded that there are serious questions regarding the merits of the
102
employees’ informational privacy claim. Despite the employees’
assertion that this argument is dispositive, they respond to the
103
primary-legitimate interest that the government now asserts: “[i]f
the government wishes to give the benefit of the doubt to applicants
who have sought treatment or counseling for illegal drug abuse, it
could easily do so by allowing them to voluntarily provide such
104
105
information.” As the Court noted in Whalen, however, courts
should avoid “policing” forms in a “Lochnerian” manner and finding
them unconstitutional merely because the way in which a question is
106
worded may be unnecessary to achieve a legitimate purpose.
The employees also argue that the Ninth Circuit correctly
concluded that Form 42 raises serious questions as to the merits of
their informational privacy claim because the potential use of the
107
“Issue Characterization Chart” by NASA to determine suitability
for employment indicates that information relating to employees’
108
private sexual matters may be the target of its inquiries. The
employees then point out that the government has failed to offer a
109
legitimate interest to justify “delving” into such matters. This
argument is unconvincing for three reasons.
First, the lower courts have already found that any claim relating
to how NASA would determine suitability for access to NASA’s
110
facilities was “unripe and unfit for judicial review.” Second, the
employees challenge Form 42 on its face, as “[b]y its [very] terms, [it]
seeks only information that has a bearing on the applicant’s suitability

101. Id. Contra Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 97, at 18.
102. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 25.
103. The government’s legitimate interest is in providing a benefit to the employee after the
government determines whether his drug use affects his suitability for employment or access.
Transcript, supra note 8, at 16.
104. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 26.
105. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597 (1977).
106. Transcript, supra note 8, at 18.
107. See Nelson v. NASA (Nelson I), 530 F.3d 865, 871 n.2 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 130
S. Ct. 1755 (2010); see also supra note 18.
108. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 44, at 33–35.
109. Id.
110. Nelson I, 530 F.3d at 873; see ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 92 (3d.
ed. 2009) (“[R]ipeness doctrine seeks to separate matters that are premature for review because
the injury is speculative and never may occur, from those cases that are appropriate for federal
court action.”).
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for government employment or a security clearance.” Finally, the
government has asserted that it will not use the “chart” to make
112
suitability determinations.
The employees argue that these
assertions should be disregarded because “supplementing the record
113
at the appellate level is an extraordinary step.” However, such
assertions surely will be relevant during any proceedings for a
permanent injunction, which would likely follow if the Supreme Court
affirmed and would further the interests of justice and judicial
114
economy. Finally, as the government noted during oral arguments,
an as-applied challenge would be more appropriate to confront any
situation in which the government asks for or uses information
generally deemed inappropriate for determining suitability for
115
employment and/or access to JPL’s facilities.
Finally, the employees make numerous arguments that refute
those proffered by the government, but all are unconvincing. First, the
employees argue that the protections against the public dissemination
of the information collected, including the Privacy Act, are
116
insufficient. However, the Privacy Act has protected the personal
information collected through the NACI process for more than three
decades, and there is no evidence that it has ever been publicly
disseminated. Moreover, it would be an extreme measure to facially
invalidate “widely-used background-check forms” merely because the
117
public dissemination of information collected is remotely possible.
Second, the employees point out that although the government
argues that it has greater discretion when acting as an employer, JPL
employees are not government employees—they are contractors
118
employed by Caltech. Further, “[b]y unilaterally imposing the new
requirements upon Caltech . . . the government is using special powers
119
that are available to it only in its sovereign capacity.” As the
111. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 97, at 21 (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 55; Transcript, supra note 8, at 21–22.
113. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 32 (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp.,
494 U.S. 472, 482 (1990) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114. In fact, during oral argument both Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg explicitly asked
about the role the Issue Characterization Chart plays in determinations for suitability, and
appeared satisfied with the government’s representation that the chart has not, and will not, be
used to determine suitability. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 21–22.
115. Id. at 25.
116. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 43–46.
117. Id. (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 601–02 (internal quotation marks omitted)).
118. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 46.
119. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008), denial for rehearing
en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (Wardlaw, J., concurring).
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government notes, however, “[the Supreme] Court has never
restricted the deference due to the government in the employment
120
context to actions affecting civil servants.” Instead it has held that
“[d]eference is . . . due to the government’s reasonable assessments of
121
its interests as contractor.”
Finally, the employees counter the government’s argument that
the information collected through the use of Form 42 is not subject to
privacy protections because it has been collected from third parties.
They argue “[t]he Fourth Amendment is concerned with how the
government obtains information, while the right to informational
privacy is concerned with what information the government obtains,
122
regardless of how or from whom the information is obtained.” Here,
both the employees and the government have a solid basis for their
positions because lower court judges have disagreed over this very
123
point.
VI. DISPOSITION
When deciding this case it is unclear whether the Supreme Court
will employ a traditional substantive due process framework or
depart from this established doctrine. Regardless of the approach the
Court takes, several signals and practical considerations indicate that
it is almost certain to rule in the government’s favor.
A. The Outcome
At first glance, it might seem that the Supreme Court granted the
petition for writ of certiorari because the Ninth Circuit’s decision
124
appears to create a circuit split with both the Fifth and D.C. Circuits.

120. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 97, at 8–9.
121. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 678 (1996).
122. Brief for Respondents, supra note 44, at 54.
123. Compare Nelson v. NASA (Nelson I), 530 F.3d 880 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted,
130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (noting that although in the Fourth Amendment context there is a general
principle “that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily
turns over to third parties . . . the legitimate expectation of privacy described in this context is a
term of art used only to define a search under the Fourth Amendment”) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) with Nat’l Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) v. U.S. Dept. of
Treasury, 25 F.3d 237, 243 n.3 (noting that “[t]he constitutional right of [informational] privacy .
. . like the right of privacy protected directly by the Fourth Amendment, is defined by (and
extends only to) a person’s ‘reasonable expectations’”) (internal citations omitted).
124. See supra Section III (B).
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This conclusion is flawed for two reasons. First, it is disputable
whether a circuit split exists, since the basis for the decisions in both
circuits was arguably the fact that the employees in those cases had a
reduced expectation of privacy due to their status as “public trust”
employees. The employees involved in this litigation are “low-risk”
125
independent contractors. Second, the Ninth Circuit’s decision is
merely an interlocutory decision that “made no legal conclusions or
factual findings that are binding in further proceedings on the
126
merits.” It is possible that upon review of a full factual record the
Ninth Circuit would reach a decision in accord with the D.C. and Fifth
Circuits’ holdings.
Moreover, the interlocutory nature of the Ninth Circuit’s decision
is critical to predicting the outcome of this case. The Supreme Court
has stated that it “generally await[s] final judgment in the lower
127
courts before exercising . . . certiorari jurisdiction,” and only reviews
decisions granting preliminary injunctions in situations where the
128
grant was “clearly erroneous.” Thus, the grant of the petition for
certiorari itself provides strong support for the notion that the Court
will rule in favor of the government.
Two practical considerations might have led the Supreme Court to
intervene at this early stage and both weigh heavily in the
government’s favor. First, the government has conducted background
129
checks for government employees for over fifty years. Each year SF130
85 is used more than 100,000 times, and Form 42 is sent to over
131
1,000,000 recipients. These forms are an integral part of the way the
government does business. The Supreme Court likely did not want to
risk the possibility of a permanent injunction that would significantly
disrupt government activities until the Supreme Court could consider
125. Compare Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 2008), denial
for rehearing en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (discussing key factual differences
between the case at bar and NTEU and Am. Fed’n leading to divergent outcomes) with Nelson
II, 568 F.3d at 1047 (Callahan, J., dissenting) (noting that the panel’s opinion “diverges from the
reasoning of the D.C. and Fifth Circuits”); see also Am. Fed’n, NTEU supra note 64 (briefly
explaining the relevant factual difference between the case at bar, and NTEU and Am. Fed’n,
that perhaps accounts for the divergent outcomes).
126. Brief for Respondents in Opposition at 12, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (Feb. 3, 2010).
127. VA Military Inst. v. United States, 508 U.S. 946, 946 (1993) (explaining the decision to
deny the petition for writ of certiorari).
128. Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 975 (1997) (per curiam).
129. Brief for Petitioners, supra note 17, at 3.
130. Id. at 42.
131. Nelson v. NASA (Nelson II), 568 F.3d 1028, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008), denial for rehearing
en banc, cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1755 (2010) (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
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132

the matter itself. Reviewing the Ninth Circuit’s decision at this
interlocutory stage appears to be the more prudent course of action.
Second, the Ninth Circuit’s decision sets no minimum standard for
alleging an infringement of one’s informational privacy rights. Thus,
under the Ninth Circuit’s decision, “any time the government collects
information an individual would prefer to keep private, it implicates a
constitutional privacy right that requires the government to satisfy an
133
ad hoc balancing test.” By not defining when privacy interests may
be constitutionally protected (e.g., when there is a sufficient threat of
public dissemination, or when a fundamental right is implicated), the
Ninth Circuit’s decision puts an enormous burden on the
134
government’s ability to operate. The Court is likely concerned that
this ruling will result in a flood of frivolous lawsuits, wasting
135
significant government time and resources. By granting certiorari at
this stage, the Court can set a standard that limits the potential for
frivolous suits.
B. The Reasoning: Three Approaches
There are three approaches the Supreme Court could take to
justify a ruling in favor of the government: (1) declare that there is no
constitutional right to informational privacy; (2) declare that there
might be a constitutional right to informational privacy, but hold that
even if there is such a right, it is not violated here; or (3) declare that
there is in fact a constitutional right to informational privacy, define
the scope and contours of the right, and apply those standards to the
facts presented. The Supreme Court most likely will take the second
approach for two reasons.
First, compared to the first approach, the second approach more
136
faithfully respects prior Supreme Court precedent. Second, taking
the third approach will most likely require the Court to broaden the
protection the Due Process Clause currently affords (i.e., by holding
that the Clause protects not only those rights deeply rooted in history
132. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 7 (Justice Roberts confirmed that if the Court sustained
the preliminary injunction the government would be enjoined from using SF-85 and Form 42 as
they are currently written throughout the Ninth Circuit’s jurisdiction. Presumably the Court
would rather find the forms unconstitutional, and invalidate them nationwide, or constitutional,
and allow the government to continue operating under the status quo.).
133. Reply Brief for Petitioners, supra note 97, at 1.
134. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 54–55.
135. See id. at 34.
136. See supra Section III (A).
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137

and tradition, but also certain “unalienable” rights). Such a holding
likely would result in an onslaught of new challenges to various
government practices and laws allegedly violating a host of claimed
“unalienable” rights. The Supreme Court might prefer not to broaden
the protections afforded by the Due Process Clause and/or to avoid
the difficult task of establishing a framework to decide which rights
are, in fact, “unalienable.” Thus, the second approach allows the
Supreme Court to decide the matter at hand while keeping the door
open to the alterations to substantive due process analysis inherent in
the third approach, which might be more properly implemented upon
a different set of facts when no other viable adjudicative approaches
are available.
1. There is no constitutional right to informational privacy.
Although there likely will be some support for declaring that the
138
Constitution does not protect any right to informational privacy, it is
unlikely that a majority (or even a plurality) of the Court will support
139
this view given its holdings in Whalen and Nixon, and the
140
recognition of such a right by the vast majority of circuits.
2. There might be a right, but it is not violated here.
Creating bright-line rules for novel and unforeseeable factual
situations is especially challenging in this context given the
141
continuously evolving nature of the concept of privacy itself. Thus,
the Court may find it tempting to rely on Whalen, and decline to
address whether a constitutional right to informational privacy
142
actually exists. However, this approach will not prevent the Court
from holding that such a right is not violated here. This is the
137. See supra Section I.
138. See id. at 14–15 (in which Justice Scalia noted that he cannot find where in the
Constitution it protects such a right, and the legislature is the appropriate branch of government
to address such issues). Further, it is interesting to note that Justice Stewart expressed a similar
view in Whalen. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 607–08 (1977) (“[t]here is no general
constitutional right to privacy . . . . [T]he protection of a person’s general right to privacy—his
right to be let alone by other people—is, like the protection of his property and of his very life,
left largely to the law of the individual States.”) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389, U.S. 347,
350–51 (1967)); Nixon v. Admin’r of Gen. Serv., 429 U.S. 589, 455 n.18 (1977) (noting that
Justice Stewart still adhered to the views he expressed in Whalen).
139. See supra Section III (A).
140. See supra Section III (B).
141. See Transcript, supra note 8, at 9 (Acting Solicitor General Katyal explained that
“privacy is something that is in flux in ways that other things aren’t, both in terms of our social
understandings, technology, and legislation itself.”).
142. See supra Section III (A).
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approach the government urges the Court to take. Thus, the Court
could hold that the employees’ rights were not violated in light of the
“reduced expectations of privacy in the employment context, the
longstanding and widespread use of SF-85 and Form 42, and the
Privacy Act’s protections regarding the maintenance and
144
dissemination of the information,”
regardless of whether the
Constitution protects a right to informational privacy.
3. The Constitution protects an individual’s right to informational
privacy.
Of course, it is also possible that the Supreme Court will take on
the Herculean task of defining a right to informational privacy. To
provide meaningful guideposts for the future, the Court should
address the following questions: (1) Is there a threshold requirement
that must be satisfied before the infringement of such a right may be
challenged? (E.g., Is an “individual interest in avoiding [the]
disclosure of personal matters” enough to bring a claim for
infringement, or must a “fundamental right” or the public
dissemination of the information be implicated?); (2) What is the
appropriate level of scrutiny when analyzing a potential
infringement? (E.g., Intermediate scrutiny or rational-basis review?);
(3) Does the level of scrutiny vary based on other considerations?
(E.g., Whether the government is acting as an employer or as enforcer
of the laws?); (4) Is a right to informational privacy implicated when
the information is sought from third parties? If the Supreme Court
chooses to answer these difficult questions, it will recognize for the
first time that the Constitution protects “unalienable rights” in
addition to those “deeply rooted” in “history and tradition,” and will
have charted a new course for substantive due process analysis. Such a
holding seems unlikely because this case could be adjudicated without
making such sweeping changes. .

143. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 15, NASA v. Nelson, No. 09-530 (Nov. 2, 2009)
(“There is no need in this case to determine the scope of a constitutionally-based right to
privacy for certain information or the range of governmental actions that may impermissibly
interfere with such a right.”).
144. Id.

